In this paper 1 , we report on coalition formation as a means to formation of groups of customers coming together to procure goods at a volume discount ("buying clubs") and economic incentives for creation of such groups. We also present a flexible test-bed system that is used to implement and test coalition formation and multi-lateral negotiation protocols, and show use of the test-bed system as a tool for implementation of a real-world "buying club".
INTRODUCTION
A coalition is a set of self-interested agents that agree to cooperate to execute a task or achieve a goal. Such coalitios were thoroughly investigated within game theory [1, 2, 4, 3] . There, issues of solution stability, fairness and payoff disbursements were discussed and analyzed. The formal analysis provided there can be used to compute multi-agent coalitions, however only in a centralized manner and with exponential complexity. DAI researchers [3, 4] have adopted some of the game-theoretical concepts and upon them developed coalition formation algorithms that optimize distribution of computations, complexity, and task allocation. However, some of the underlying assumptions of such algorithms, which are essential for their implementation, do not necessarily hold in real-world multi-agent systems. In this paper, we report on coalition formation as a means to achievement of economies of scale among customer agents, and economic mechanisms for its real-world applications.
INCENTIVES TO FORM COALITIONS
When one studies an electronic commerce system, especially one dependent on a novel approach such as buyer coalitions, one has to consider the incentives involved in this system. Such incentives are usually monetary -reduction of cost, 1This material is based on work supported in part by MURI contract N00014-96-1222 and CoABS Darpa contract F30602-98-2-0138 and NSF grants IRI-9612131 and IRI-9712607 Permission to make digital o1' hard copies of all oi" part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Agents 2000 Barcelona Spain Copyright ACM 2000 1-58113-230-1/00/6...$5.00 or increased profit, although they can include less tangible benefits such as reduction of risk (or allowing someone else to assume the risk), or increase in market size or market share.
Since marketing to one buyer is usually less expensive then marketing to multiple buyers, the incentive to sell wholesale will usually be present. Due to increased complexity of negotiation, up to some lot size N,.~t,~iz the supplier has a no incentive for selling at a wholesale price. As the size of the lot increases past that point, selling wholesale lots becomes beneficial for supplier.
The customer utility curve is commonly known in the field of economics and illustrates the law of decreasing returns. However, a more realistic representation of the utility curve ( fig. 1) shows that there is range of acceptable quanities of the good, after which the utility of each additional unit drops sharply. This is due to the additional costs associated with storage or management of surpluses. Let us define the Maximum Utility Range (MUR) as a range in which the utility is high while management costs remain low. If the supplier's optimal size of wholesale lot nwholesale E MUR, then the customer can purchase a wholesale lot.
Thus, supplier has an incentive to sell wholesale lots, and it must give the customer an incentive to buy wholesale by lowering per-unit price at when the requested lot size is large enough.
In the real world, a single customer rarely wants to buy large enough quant!ties of goods to justify wholesale purchasing (n~hot~s,~Z~ ~ MUR). In order to lower the purchase price (and, therefore, increase utility), self-interested customer agents can join in a coalition such that nwholesale E MUR~o,~li~io,~ = ~ MURa where MURi is the MUR of each member of the coalition. This would enable the coalition to buy a wholesale lot from the supplier, break it into sub-lots and distribute them to its members, thus raising the utility of each individual member.
However, the formation and administration of coalitions, as well as distribution of sub-lots has its costs, closely related to the real-world situation where the coalition is formed. A coalition is only viable if the increase in group's total utility from wholesale purchases is greater than the cost of creating and running such coalition. 
ISSUES IN DESIGN OF COALITION SYS-TEMS
It is possible to construct a number of coalition models and protocols, all of which would have different properties and requirements. In general, all coalition models include several stages:
• Negotiation: The coalition leader or representative negotiates with one or more supplier.
• Leader Election/Voting: The members elect a coalition leader or cast direct votes for bids.
• Coalition Formation: The coalition leader solicits for new members, based on a set of admission constraints.
• Payment Collection: The coalition leader or a third party collects the payments.
• Execution/Distribution stage: The purchased goods must be distributed to the members of the coalition.
As one designs a coalition protocol, he must take into account issues such as coalition stability, distribution of costs and risks among coalition memebers, allocation of utility after the transaction is completed, and need for trust in members of coalition, suppliers or third parties.
Most coalition protocols can be divided into two classes,prenegotiation and post-negotiation. In pre-negotiated coalitions, the coalition leader negotiates a deal with one or more suppliers, and then advertises the creation of the coalition and waits for other members to join. In pre-negotiation protocols, the most important issue is whether the leader, coalition member or the suppliers carry the risk from uncertain coalition size. In post-negotiation scenario, the group is formed first, based on some admission criteria. Then, a group leader negotiates with suppliers, and offers the resulting deal to the group. Here, the group must be able to trust its leader to negotiate on its behalf. Unless the group is formed by a number of people who already know each other, there has to be an explicit leader selection/verification mechanism, or a mechanism for collective negotiation.
DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM
As an initial problem domain, we chose collective book purchasing. In the university setting, one sees large number of students that are enrolled in the same class purchasing the The testbed system (see figure 2) consists of a coalition server, an auctioneer agent, set of supplier agents, and a web-based interface for end users. The system is based on a simple pre-negotiation protocol and a variation of sealedbid reverse auction that allows suppliers to disclose their discount policies.
Users use the W-WW interface to conduct reverse auctions with supplier agents. The supplier agents, in turn, are given a step function volume discount schedule and make their bids accordingly to projected sizes of coalitions. After the reverse auction is complete, the coalition server opens the coalition to new members, which can join the group if they meet the entrance requirements. After the group is formed, the coalition server proceeds to execute the transaction.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the economic incentives that drive coalition formation among self-interested agents, concentrating on formation of buyer coalitions and obtaining volume discounts. We have also discussed variety of coalition models and their properties, and presented an implemented system using one of such models.
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